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TORT LIABILITY OF COUNTIES
Ever since 1889 when the Supreme Court of Appeals handed down
its decision in the case of Fry v. County of Albemarle,' Virginia has
adhered strictly to the doctrine that counties, as political subdivisions
of the state, are totally immune from tort liability. As a result a county
in Virginia cannot be sued unless it is so provided by statute, and
this principle remains firm and unquestioned in Virginia's courts
under the doctrine of stare decisis.
2
This Virginia view was reiterated in Mann v. County Board of Arl-
ington County.3 The plaintiff was injured through the negligence
of the county in the maintenance and operation of its sidewalks.
Prior to the accident, Arlington County had elected to withdraw
from the provisions of a statute which would have placed its streets
under the state's secondary system of highways.4 Therefore, the
county was solely responsible for supervision of the sidewalk area
when the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff contended that Arlington
County should be liable for its negligence on the same basis as a
municipal corporation. In support of this contention it was argued
that Arlington County has many of the characteristics of a municipal
corporation, and, hence, the tort liability law regarding municipalities
in Virginia should be applied.5 The court rejected the plaintiff's
186 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1oo4 (1889).
2"The West Point, 71 F. Supp. 2o6 (E.D. Va. 1947); Parker v. Prince William
County, 198 Va. 231, 93 S.E.2d 136 (1956); Nelson County v. Coleman, 126 Va. 275,
io' S.E. 413 (1919); Nelson County v. Loving, 126 Va. 283, 101 S.E. 406 (1919); 5
Michie's Jur., Counties § 84 (1949).
9igg Va. 16q, 98 S.E.2d 515 (1957).
'The Secondary Road Law, enacted by the General Assembly in 1932, incor-
porated all secondary roads into the State Highway System. Va. Acts 1932, c. 415.
The law provided, however, that the qualified voters of a county could withdraw
from the operation of the act and have the county secondary road system remain a
local function. Id. § ii. At the present time only Arlington and Henrico counties
are electing to maintain their own secondary road systems. Virginia State Chamber
of Commerce, Virginia's Government ioi (1955).
GWhether or not the plaintiff could have recovered, had his contention that Vir-
ginia municipal tort law should govern been accepted, seems to be the subject of sharp
judicial conflict. Decisions have turned on the seriousness of the street or side-
walk defect with little or no mention of the governmental-proprietary distinction.
The Virginia court assumes that the function is proprietary, stating that cities have
a duty of reasonable care to see that their streets and highways are kept in a
safe condition. Cases imposing liability upon cities for defective streets and side-
walks include Buck v. Danville, 177 Va. 582, 15 S.E.2d 31 (1941); Norfolk v. Hall,
175 Va. 545, 9 S.E.2d 356 (1940); Danville v. Sallie, 146 Va. 349, 131 S.E. 788
(1926); Richmond v. Rose, 127 Va. 772, 102 S.E. 561 (192o). Cities have been held
not liable in Richmond v. McDonald, 183 Va. 694, 33 S.E.2d 186 (1945); Staunton
CASE COMMENTS
contention, stating that the rule of county immunity is well settled in
Virginia.6
It is firmly established that a municipal corporation may be liable
for negligence in the performance of proprietary or non-governmental
functions, 7 and this rule has been fully accepted in Virginia.8 How-
ever, decisions in Virginia have denied recovery against a city unless
the function involved was unquestionably proprietary. Recovery
has not been allowed, for example, in the fields of police protection, 9
garbage removal, 10 fire protection," and licensing.12 In restricting the
scope of municipal liability, the judiciary appears to be in accord
with the viewpoint of the legislature. When damages were allowed
in Hoggard v. City of Richmond13 for an injury resulting from the
negligent maintenance of a swimming pool, the General Assembly
enacted a statute whereby cities may be held liable only for gross
negligence in the operation of parks and swimming pools.1 4
The principal case is in accord with the general and prevailing
view in this country on the tort liability of quasi-municipal corpora-
tions such as counties and towns. These units are usually considered
immune from tort liability regardless of the type of function that is
v. Kerr, i6o Va. 420, x68 S.E. 326 (1933); Roanoke v. Sutherland, 159 Va. 749, 167
S.E. 243 (1933); Clark v. Richmond, 83 Va. 355, 5 S.E. 369 (1887). See Note, 19 Va. L.
Rev. 748 (1933). At least one recent decision has held that the city must have
notice of the defect before it can be held liable. West v. Portsmouth, 196 Va. 51o,
84 S.E.2d 503 (1954)-
6Arlington County carried liability insurance which would have paid any
judgment awarded and because of this coverage withdrew its original demurrer
pleading governmental immunity. The court ruled that the immunity was inherent
and could not be waived. For discussion see Bell, Municipal Corporations, Annual
Survey of Va. Law, 43 Va. L. Rev. 968, 972 (1957).
7
Bertiz v. Los Angeles, 74 Cal. App. 792, 241 Pac. 921 (1925); Denver v. Deane,
1o Colo. 375, 16 Pac. 3o (1887); Staunton v. Detroit, 329 Mich. 516, 46 NAV.2d
569 0951); City of Jackson v. McFadden, 181 Miss. 1, 177 So. 755 (1937); City of
Houston v. Schilling, 15o Tex. 387, 240 S.W.2d 1oio (ig5i); Warden v. City of
Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S.E. 375 (1925); Harper, Torts § 295 (1933).
8
Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 20oo S.E. 61o (1939); Richmond v. James,
170 Va. 553, 197 S.E. 416 (1938); Portsmouth v. Madrey, 168 Va. 517, 191 S.E.
595 (1937); Danville v. Howard, 156 Va. 32, 157 S.E. 733 (1931); Richmond v. Virginia
Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 6o, 138 S.E. 5o3 (1927); 13 Michie's Jur., Munici-
pal Corporations § 102 (1951).
"Harman v. Lynchburg, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) *37 (1880).
"OAshbury v. Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 147 S.E. 223 (1929).
"Richmond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 6o, 138 S.E. 5 3
(1927) (dictum).
"0Terry v. Richmond, 94 Va. 537, 27 S.E. 429 (1897).
i172 Va. 145, 20oo S.E. 61o (1939).
"Va. Code Ann. § 15-714 (Repl. Vol. 1956).
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negligently performed. 15 As early as 1929 this rule was changed in
Pennsylvania by Bell v. City of Pittsburgh.16 Allegheny County, a co-
defendant, was held liable for injuries resulting from the negligent
operation of an elevator. In 1956 a federal court, in applying the law
of Pennsylvania, followed the decision of the Bell case,17 and it is
now apparently settled in that state that a county may be held liable
for its torts.
18
The Pennsylvania rule seems to have been adopted by the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina. In Rhodes v. City of Asheville 0 an
action was brought for the negligent operation of an airport. Hender-
son County was one of three co-defendants, having acted jointly with
two municipalities in the construction and maintenance of the air-
port. In holding the county liable the court said: "Ordinarily a county
does not undertake to perform functions except in a governmental
capacity. But when it undertakes, with legislative sanction, to perform
an activity which is proprietary or corporate in character, such a
county may be liable in tort to the same extent as a city or town
would be if engaged in the same activity. '20 Virginia has a statute,
similar to that of North Carolina, authorizing cities and counties
jointly to build and operate airports.21 As yet, there has been re-
ported in Virginia no case involving an act negligently performed by a
city and county in a joint undertaking.
It is important to point out that Virginia cities are independent
entities entirely separate from the counties in which they are located.
This is true of only two other cities in the United States, Baltimore
and St. Louis.22 By virtue of this unique organization Virginia's coun-
1Snethen v. Harrison County, 172 Iowa 81, 152 N.V. 12 (1915); Board of County
Com'rs of Shawnee County v. Jacobs, 79 Kan. 76, 99 Pac. 817 (19o8); Downing v.
Mason County, 87 Ky. 208, 8 S.V. 264 (1888); Hughes v. Monroe County, 147 N.Y.
49, 41 N.E. 407 (1895); 14 Am. Jur., Counties § 48 (1938). The apparent reason for
this is that a county is an involuntary corporation created by the state. It cannot
be separated from the state and, therefore, always possesses the inherent immunity
of its creator. Query, when the county engages in a voluntary undertaking?
"'297 Pa. 185, 146 Ati. 567 (1929).
"7Daniels v. County of Allegheny, 145 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
"'No Pennsylvania decision... exonerates a county from tort liability when
engaged in a proprietary function .... Neither in that case [Hartness v. Allegheny
County, 349 Pa. 248, 37 A.2d 18 (1944)] nor in any case cited is the county ex-
cused from liability for torts solely because it is an arm of the state government."
Daniels v. County of Allegheny, 145 F. Supp. 358, 361 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
"23o N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371 (1949), rehearing denied, 53 S.E.2d 313 (1949).
"52 S.E.2d at 376.
"Va. Code Ann. § 5-29 (1950).
,Eubank, Virginia's Towns and Cities, The Commonwealth, Dec. 1948, p.
21 at 23. This article also gives a good discussion of Virginia's cities, their foun-
dation, and unique political status.
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ties and cities are equal in the state's governmental hierarchy. His-
torically, the basic difference between a city and county is that a city
derives its authority from a charter while county authority stems from
the statutes of the particular state. This distinction is recognized
throughout the United States and, in this respect, Virginia's organiza-
tion does not differ from that of any other state.23 Primarily, counties
are created to govern rural areas while municipalities are chartered
to govern urban areas and to provide the special services they require.
Today it hardly seems appropriate to call Arlington County a rural
area. As a county it performs for its citizens and for the state all those
functions which are usually associated with counties; in addition, it
must perform many functions which are peculiar to municipalities.
Virginia, because of the unique organization of its political sub-
divisions, has more reason than other states to follow the modern
trend that is being developed in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.
Such a policy would be logical and consistent with the political or-
ganization of the state. Metropolitan counties such as Arlington are
bound to engage in a great variety of non-governmental functions.
More and more they will act and behave like cities, and the courts
should recognize this. It is unrealistic to hold to a law that allows
an individual injured through the negligence of a city-operated
park to recover full compensation, and denies recovery to an individ-
ual injured through the negligence of a county-operated park.
WILuAms M. A. ROmANs, JR.
OBut note that both are subject to code provisions and other legislative en-
actments. A chartered city usually has a certain amount of independence, but this
varies widely from state to state. A county, on the other hand, is almost entirely at
the mercy of the legislatpre,
1958]
